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Abstract
We consider the optimal nonlinear income taxation problem in a dynamic,
stochastic environment when the government is sluggish in the sense that it
cannot change the tax rule as uncertainty resolves. We argue that the zero
top marginal tax rate result in static models is of little practical importance
because it actually holds only when the top earner in the initial period receives
the highest shock in every period.
JEL classification: H21
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1 Introduction
Since theNewDynamic Public Financewas inaugurated, progress has beenmade
in clarifying what the optimal dynamic nonlinear income tax looks like. This
agenda aims to extend the seminal work of Mirrlees (1971), who studies optimal
income taxation in a static environment, to dynamic, stochastic environments.1
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Dynamic tax rules are in eect dynamic contracts because taxpayers have private
information about their labor productivity, so the optimal dynamic income tax rule
is generally complicated: it is nonstationary and depends on the entire history of
income declared for any taxpayer. However, it is questionable whether govern-
ments in the real world can implement such complex tax rules because changing
the tax rule frequently and tracking histories of incomewould entail large adminis-
trative and political costs. Indeed, regarding the stationarity of the tax rule, the US
government has not changed its income tax system in a major way since 1986. The
Japanese government is more flexible, but it has not changed its income tax system
in a major way since 2007. Therefore, once the tax rules are fixed, they persist for
some time.
In view of this observation, we contribute to the New Dynamic Public Finance
literature by considering optimal dynamic income taxation when the government
cannot change the tax rule over time. Our interpretation is that we must restrict
our attention to a simple dynamic tax rule because our government is sluggish.
Naturally, we also assume that the sluggish government makes a full commitment
to its tax rule. That is, the government cannot change the tax rule once it is
determined in the initial period. Moreover, because the length of history is time-
dependent, the sluggish government can look at only current incomes, just as it
can only look at current incomes in the initial period.2 Although our assumptions
might be extreme, we believe that it is important and useful to have a sense about
what the optimal dynamic income tax looks like when the set of tax rules is limited
to ones that are feasible in practice. Our motivation is to develop a tractable, realistic
model of dynamic income taxation.
We consider a finite horizon model in which the government would like to
maximize the equal weight utilitalian social welfare function. Our economy is
heterogeneous because we fix the type distribution in the initial period.3 People re-
ceive idiosyncratic shocks in each period that are i.i.d. amongpeople but otherwise,
the stochastic structure is general.4 We assume that the government confiscates all
2Technically speaking, this is explained as follows: If a tax function depends non-trivially on
an individual’s entire income history, its domain is time-dependent, because the length of income
history is time-dependent. Therefore it is necessarily nonstationary.
3If we do not fix it, the model has identical agents facing uncertainty, which is like a macro
model. However, as long as we consider the equal weight utilitalian social welfare function, the
distinction is not essential for the optimal tax rule as Farhi and Werning (forthcoming) illustrate.
4In Section 2.2, we argue that focusing on idiosyncratic shocks is without loss of generality. We
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incomes that are not consumed in each period, so agents cannot save nor borrow.5
In fact, we show that a sluggish government cannot allow saving or borrowing
as long as it would like to address the inherent incentive problems. Although the
analytical characterizations and even numerical analysis of the optimal dynamic
tax rule are dicult in general, we can analytically characterize the optimal tax rule
because our problem can be reduced to a static one due to the sluggishness of the
government. Specifically, this is because under a sluggish government, the tax rule
depends on only the current income, so we can regard an agent living for T periods
as distinct agents in each period and for each shock if we do not allow saving or
borrowing. Therefore, we can directly apply the arguments for static models to our
model.
A famous result in the static optimal income taxation is that the top marginal
tax rate is zero. That is, the top earner’s marginal tax rate is zero. However,
we cast doubt on its policy relevance as Diamond and Saez (2011) do.6 In our
dynamic stochastic economy, the support of types will move over time, and a
direct application of the static arguments implies that the marginal tax rate is zero
at the top of the expanded type space, or the union of supports over time. Thus, if
the largest value of the shock is positive, the zero top marginal tax result would
apply only when the top earner in the initial period receives the largest possible
value of shock in every period. Therefore, the event that the marginal tax rate is
zero at the ex post top actually has probability zero.
Our tax rule is fixed over time and therefore depends on only current income, so
it would be a simple one in the literature. At the other extreme, Farhi andWerning
(forthcoming) , Battaglini andCoate (2008), andKocherlakota (2005) study themost
general rule by considering nonstationary tax rules that depend on the history of
income. Whereas the stochastic structure of the shock is general in Kocherlakota
(2005), Farhi and Werning (forthcoming) and Battaglini and Coate (2008) consider
Markov processes.7 In the middle, Albanesi and Sleet (2006) study a nonstationary
could also consider aggregate shocks.
5This assumption is not uncommon in the literature. For example, it is also made by Battaglini
and Coate (2008) who study optimal income taxation in a dynamic, stochastic environment and
Brito et al. (1991) who study it in a dynamic, deterministic economy.
6The source of their claim is dierent from ours, though. In Diamond and Saez (2011), the source
is a zero marginal social welfare weight on the utility of high income earners.
7On the other hand, whereas Kocherlakota (2005) does not consider the time-consistency of a tax
rule, Battaglini and Coate (2008) provide conditions under which their rule is time-consistent. In a
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tax rule that depends on only current income when the shock is i.i.d. See Table 1
for a comparison between our work and others’ work.8
Table 1: The position of this paper in the literature
Shock History Stationary Commitment
Farhi and Werning (forthcoming) Markov Yes No Yes
Battaglini and Coate (2008) Markov Yes No Yes/No
Kocherlakota (2005) General Yes No Yes
Albanesi and Sleet (2006) i.i.d. No No Yes
This paper General No Yes Yes
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we state the basic
structure of the model, present our problem, and characterize the second-best tax
rule. Section 3 contains our conclusions and discusses subjects for future research.
Proofs omitted from the main text are provided in an Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a finite horizon model with a unit mass of agents. The economy
lasts for T + 1 periods. In period 0, each agent is endowed with type w 2 W0  R++
distributed with density function fw. However, there are idiosyncratic shocks to
the agents’ types in the subsequent periods.9 At the beginning of period 1, an
element of zT = fztgTt=1 2 ZT is drawn for each agent according to a density function
fz. We assume that W0 and Z  R are (non-degenerate) closed intervals. Note
that, although shocks for all T periods are drawn in the initial period, the agent
only learns them as time goes on, so that in period t the agent observes the history
(w; z1; :::; zt). If an agent is endowed with type w in the initial period, his type will
change to wt  t(w; zT) in period t where t(  ;  ) is continuously dierentiable.
For example, if we consider a linear technology, t(w; zT) = w+
Pt
s=1 zs. We assume
two-period deterministic environment, Berliant and Ledyard (forthcoming) study a time-consistent
tax rule that is nonstationary and depends on history.
8In a two-period deterministic environment, Gaube (2010) compares three types of nonstationary
tax rules: a tax rule that is time-consistent and depends on history; a tax rule that is not time-
consistent and depends on history; and a tax rule that depends on only current income (but can
change over time).
9We can add a public or private aggregate shock without changing the main result. See Section
2.2.
4
that for any w 2 W0, t(w; zT) > 0 for all zT 2 ZT in any period. Moreover, we
assume Wt 1 \Wt , ; for any t  1 where Wt is the range of t(  ;  ).10 As long
as t(w; 0) = w, 0 2 Z is sucient for this. Finally, we assume that the draws are
i.i.d. among agents and law of large number holds.11 Thus, fz(zT) fw(w) denotes the
density of agents having type w in the initial period and getting shock zT.
The agents supply labor and consume the good produced under constant re-
turns to scale in each period. As is usual in optimal taxation models, they face a
trade-o between consumption and leisure. The utility function is
U

fct; `tgTt=0

=
TX
t=0
tu(ct; `t) (1)
where ` 2 [0; 1] is labor, c is consumption, and  > 0 is the discount factor. We
assume that u(c; `) is twice continuously dierentiable, strictly concave, increasing
in c, and decreasing in `. Moreover, we assume that leisure 1   ` is a noninferior
good.12 In our model, type represents the earning ability of agents. That is, if the
labor supply of agent w is `, his gross income is given by y = w`. Temporarily,
let there be no taxes. Then, assuming that the agents cannot save, their budget
constraint in period t is ct = yt since u is strictly increasing in c.
The government would like to maximize social welfare. In this paper, we
consider the following utilitarian social welfare function:
SW =
Z
W0
Z
ZT
U

fct; yt=wtgTt=0

fz(zT)dzT fw(w)dw: (2)
Since the one-period utility function is strictly concave and leisure is a noninferior
good, it follows that redistribution is desirableunder theutilitarianwelfare function
(Seade, 1982). The planner would like to carry out redistribution through income
taxes, but he cannot observe the agents’ types. Thus, the government needs to
design a mechanism that makes the agents reveal their true types.
10Because the range of t is in R, t is continuous, andW0  ZT is connected and compact,Wt is
a closed interval. We further assume thatWt is non-degenerate.
11Kocherlakota (2005), for example, also makes these assumptions. Regarding the law of large
numbers, there are some technical issues for the case of continuum of i.i.d. random variables (Judd,
1985). However, Sun (2006) provides a solution to this issue by presenting a probability space in
which the law of large number holds.
12Hellwig (2007) presents another assumption that is a cardinal property of u instead of the
assumption that leisure is a noninferior good, which is an ordinal property.
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We consider a direct mechanism in which agents report their types and the
government specifies the pair of consumption c and gross income y for each report
in each period. Specifically, we call xt(  )  (ct(  ); yt(  )) an allocation rule. In general,
the rule could be nonstationary and depend on histories of reports as in Battaglini
and Coate (2008). However, because our planner is sluggish, he cannot enforce
complex rules that vary over time. Moreover, as a consequence, he looks at only
current reports, because the domain of his tax rule must be time-dependent if he
looks at history. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the allocation rule that is
time-invariant (i.e., xt(  ) = x(  ) for all t) and does not depend on history (or it
depends on only the current report).13 For example, if agent reports wt in period t,
his allocation in that period is x(wt) = (c(wt); y(wt)).
It might be more straightforward to consider an indirect mechanism in which
the agents report their incomes and the government specifies income taxes for each
report. However, it readily follows that Hammond’s (1979) result applies to our
problem because, as we will see, our problem reduces to a static one. That is,
characterizing the direct mechanism is equivalent to designing a tax rule (  ) and
letting each agent choose his income yt and consumption ct = yt   (yt).
Since the planner cannot observe the agents’ types, he faces incentive compat-
ibility (IC) constraints that require that the agents do not misreport their types.
Recall that our allocation rule is independent of time (i.e., xt(  ) = x(  ) for all t).
Thus, we omit the time subscripts andwrite our allocation rule as x(  ) = (c(  ); y(  )).
Let u(x(w0);w) = u(c(w0); y(w0)=w). This is the one-period utility that agent w ob-
tains when he reports w0. Since the agents report their types in each period, the IC
constraints are imposed in each period. Let Wt be the range of t(  ;  ) for t  1.
Then, the IC constraint in the last period is given by
8w 2 WT; u (x(w);w)  u (x(w0);w) for all w0 2 WT: (ICT)
On the other hand, assuming that the agents cannot save, the IC constraint in
period t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::;T   1g is given by
8w 2 Wt; u(x(w);w) +
X
st+1
s
Z
ZT
max
w˜2Ws
u(x(w˜);ws) fz(zT)dzT
13We note that the government is aware that it is sluggish, so once it chooses its allocation rule, it
knows the rule cannot be changed, and accounts for this when choosing the rule.
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 u(x(w0);w) +
X
st+1
s
Z
ZT
max
w˜2Ws
u(x(w˜);ws) fz(zT)dzT for all w0 2 Wt (ICt)
where ws = s(w; zT). Since our mechanism does not depend on history, the re-
port in the current period does not aect the expected continuation payo (i.e.,P
st+1 s
R
ZT
maxw˜2Ws u(x(w˜);ws) fz(zT)dzT does not depend on the report in period t).
As a result, the IC constraint in period t reduces to
8w 2 Wt; u(x(w);w)  u(x(w0);w) for all w0 2 Wt:
In addition to the IC constraints, the government faces a resource constraint:
it needs to finance G in units of consumption good through the tax. This revenue
could be used for a public good that is fixed in quantity (and thus in cost) or the
public good could enter utility as an additively separable term. We assume that the
government can borrow or save at rate . Then, the government has the following
resource constraint (RC):
G 
Z
W0
 
y(w)   c(w) fw(w)dw + TX
t=1
t
Z
W0
Z
ZT
 
y(wt)   c(wt) fz(zT)dzT fw(w)dw:
(RC)
Suppose that an agent is endowed with type w in the initial period. Let
V(x(  );w) =
Z
ZT
U

fc(wt); y(wt)=wtgTt=0

fz(zT)dzT: (3)
where wt = t(w; zT). This is the expected lifetime utility that the agent obtains by
reporting truthfully in each period. Then, the planner’s problem is given by
max
x(  )
Z
W0
V(x(  );w) fw(w)dw
s.t. (RC) and (ICt) for all t:
(4)
For reference, the first-best allocation rule x(  ) maximizes the utilitarian welfare
function subject to the resource constraint only, assuming that the government
knows the type of each agent at each time.
Let W =
ST
t=0Wt. In what follows, we make the following assumption on the
one-period utility function u, in addition to the regularity conditions stated before:
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Assumption 1 (Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property: SCP). 8(c; y;w) 2 R2+W,
 wuc(c; y=w)=u`(c; y=w) is increasing in w.14
Here is the key idea of our work. When we solve the problem (4), we exploit
the fact that our mechanism is time-invariant and does not depend on history, and
we consider the utilitarian social welfare function. Therefore, the problem can
be reduced to a static problem in which the total mass of agents is expanded toPT
t=0 
t. That is, each person in each period is considered to be a dierent person
in the static model. Utilitarianism gives us the equivalence. Then, we take the
standard approach for static optimal income taxation problems to solve (4). That
is, we consider a relaxed problem in which the IC constraints are replaced with
weaker conditions and invoke the fact that a solution to the relaxed problem is also
a solution to the original problem under Assumption 1.15
Before stating our main result, let us summarize the regularity conditions we
have imposed:
Assumption 2 (Regularity conditions).
1. W0  R++ and Z  R are non-degenerate closed intervals;
2. t is continuously dierentiable; for any w 2 W0, t(w; zT) > 0 for all zT 2 ZT in
any period; Wt 1 \Wt , ; and Wt is non-degenerate for any t  1;
3. u(c; `) is twice continuously dierentiable, strictly concave, increasing in c, and
decreasing in `; leisure 1   ` is a noninferior good;
Let w = minW and w = maxW (thus, W = [w;w]). Moreover, recall that
x(  ) is the first-best allocation rule that maximizes social welfare subject to the
resource constraint. Then, the main properties of the planner’s allocation rule are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, (i) x(w)  x(w) for any w 2 Wwith equality
at w = w. If y(w) is strictly increasing at w = w, x(w) = x(w). Moreover, if y(w) > 0,
then x(w)  x(w) for any w 2 (w;w); (ii) 0(y(w)) = 0 and if y(w) is strictly increasing
at w = w, 0(y(w)) = 0. Moreover, if y(w) > 0, then 0(y(w)) 2 (0; 1) for any w 2 [w;w).
14This assumption is equivalent to assuming that the consumption good is a normal good. See
p. 182 of Mirrlees (1971).
15This argument crucially depends on the fact that mechanism is static. Otherwise, general
assumptions like the single crossing property that connect the relaxed problem to the original one
are not known (Farhi and Werning, forthcoming).
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Proof. See Appendix. 
Property (i) states that the allocation is ecient at the top of W and if income
is strictly increasing at the bottom of W, the allocation is also ecient there. In
addition, no allocation can be distorted upward from eciency and in particular,
if income is positive, the allocation is distorted downward from eciency in the
interior of W. Property (ii) states that the marginal tax rate is zero at the top of W
and if income is strictly increasing at the bottom ofW, the marginal tax rate is also
zero there. On the other hand, if income is positive, the marginal tax rate is more
than 0 but less then 1 in the interior ofW.
By Proposition 1, as long as everyone works so that y(w) > 0 for all w 2 W, the
allocation is generally first-best and the marginal tax rate is zero only at the top of
the expanded type space W. For illustration, suppose t(w; zT) = w +
Pt
s=0 zs. Then,
if maxZ > 0, no one’s allocation is generally first-best and no one’s marginal tax rate is
zero in the first T periods nor the last period except when the type of the top earner in the
initial period reaches w = maxW. In practice, it is unlikely that the planner sets the
marginal tax rate at the ex post top to zero because he does so only when the shock
to the top earner in the initial period takes the largest value in every period.
The results above are in sharp contrast with those of Battaglini and Coate (2008)
in which the shock follows a Markov chain over two states (high and low). In their
ecient tax rule, the allocation is distorted only when people’s type is currently
and has always been low. That is, the allocations of agents who are currently, or
have at some point been high types are first-best. Therefore, the fraction of people
whose allocations are distorted is decreasing over time. However, their results
crucially depend on the following facts: the support of types is fixed over time,
and the tax rule can depend on history. In our model, the support of types moves
over time, and the tax rule can depend on only the current income. As a result, all
people’s allocations are almost surely distorted in any period.
2.1 Saving
In the foregoing analysis, we assumed that people cannot save nor borrow be-
cause the government confiscates all incomes that are not consumed as in Battaglini
and Coate (2008). In this section, we show that, under the linear technology of
shock, the government actually cannot allow saving or borrowing under stationary
9
tax rules that depend on only the current income.
To this end, suppose that there is a risk-free bond market with the interest rate
R > 0 and let b(w) be the endogenous bond holding of agent w. In the presence
of bond holding, we consider a mechanism x(  ) = (y(  ); c(  ); b(  )). Naturally, b(  )
is time-invariant and depends on only current report because of the government’s
sluggishness. In this section, we focus on the linear technology of shock: t(w; zT) =
w +
Pt
s=1 zs. Then, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2. Suppose t(w; zT) = w +
Pt
s=1 zs. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if the
government satisfies the IC constraints, b(w) = 0 for all w 2 W.
Proof. We argue by backward induction. At first, b(wT) = 0 on WT by terminal
condition (i.e., in the last period, no one will save and borrowing is not permitted
because people cannot repay). Now, suppose b(wt) = 0 onWt (t  T), and let wt 1 2
Wt 1. Then, there existsw 2 W0 and zt 1 2 Zt 1 such thatwt 1 = w+Pt 1s=1 zs. Without
loss of generality, supposemaxZ > 0.16 BecauseWt\Wt 1 , ;, minWt  maxWt 1.
If wt 1  minWt, b(wt 1) = 0 by assumption. Thus, we assume wt 1 < minWt.
Take w0t 1 > wt 1 in a neighborhood of wt 1 (with diameter less than the length
of Z). Then, there exists w0 2 W0 and z0t 1 2 Zt 1 such that w0t 1 = w0 +
Pt 1
s=1 z0s.
Moreover, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, we can take zt; z0t 2 Z such that
wt  wt 1 + zt = w0t 1 + z0t  w0t.17 Then, if the IC constraints hold (i.e., people report
truthfully), the budget constraints imply (wt) = y(wt)  c(wt) b(wt)+ (1+R)b(wt 1)
and (wt) = y(wt) c(wt) b(wt)+(1+R)b(w0t 1), and thus b(wt 1) = b(w0t 1). Therefore,
b(wt 1) is constant in (the upper half of) its neighborhood. Because wt 1 (< minWt)
is arbitrary and b(wˆt 1) = 0 for wˆt 1  minWt, it follows that b(wt 1) = 0 onWt 1. 
Therefore, as long as the sluggish government would like to satisfy the IC con-
straints, it cannot allow saving or borrowing, even if they are taxed. Because our
revenue constraint is integrated over time, the government can save and borrow
for the agents. However, a sluggish government and IC constraints leave no room
for saving and borrowing not because the government borrows and saves for the
16An analogous argument holds for maxZ < 0.
17Because the diameter of the neighborhood is smaller than the length of Z, w0t 1 + minZ <
wt 1+maxZ. Thus, forwt 2 [w0t 1+minZ;wt 1+maxZ], we can take zt; z0t 2 Z such thatwt = wt 1+zt
and wt = w0t 1 + z
0
t respectively.
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consumers, but because it cannot actually address the intertemporal wedge.1819 In-
deed, Farhi and Werning (forthcoming) also have a revenue constraint integrated
over time, but according to their simulations, bond holdings are not zero.
We can see that the stochastic shocks are important for the argument above.
Due to the shocks, each state can be reached by several agents who generally have
dierent histories. When the government would like to address the intertemporal
wedge, this makes it impossible for the government to take care of these agents’ IC
constraints simultaneously due to its sluggishness.20
2.2 Aggregate shocks
Weassumed that agents receive idiosyncratic shocks, but our argument remains
intact even if we consider a private or public aggregate shock instead of or in
addition to private idiosyncratic shocks.
Consider first the case of only an aggregate shock but no idiosyncratic shocks.
Suppose that draws from fz(zT) are aggregate shocks, so all agents face the same
shock. At period 1, people’s expected utility is
R
ZT
PT
t=1 u(ct; yt=wt)

fz(zT)dzT. Thus,
the social welfare isZ
W0
8>><>>:
Z
ZT
0BBBBB@ TX
t=1
u(ct; yt=wt)
1CCCCCA fz(zT)dzT + u(c0; y0=w)
9>>=>>; fw(w)dw
=
Z
W0
Z
ZT
U

fct; yt=wtgTt=0

fz(zT)dzT fw(w)dw = SW:
Therefore, the social welfare function is unchanged. Moreover, if the aggregate
shock is private, the IC constraints are identical to those in the idiosyncratic case,
as long as the idiosyncratic shocks are i.i.d. across people. Thus, our argument
is unchanged. However, if the aggregate shock is public and the government can
also observe the shock, we need some modifications because the IC constraints are
imposed for each realization of the shock, as opposed to the idiosyncratic case.
18The intertemporal wedge is related to Euler equation, or intertemporal substitution. See, for
example, Kocherlakota (2004).
19It is worth noting that Proposition 2 holds regardless of people’s risk attitude (i.e., whether they
are risk-neutral or risk-averse).
20Kapicka (2006) studies optimal income taxation in a dynamic, deterministicmodel where people
can allocate their time to human capital investment. Focusing on steady states, the government can
specify (constant) investment levels for each agent even though it is sluggish.
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Suppose that the aggregate shock is public and let Wt;zT be the range of t(  ; zT).
Because of the government’s sluggishness, the IC constraint in period t when the
shock is zT reduces to
8w 2 Wt;zT ; u(x(w);w)  u(x(w0);w) for all w0 2 Wt;zT :
Then, lettingW =
ST
t=0
S
zT2ZT Wt;zT , the same argument as used for the idiosyncratic
case would follow.21
Finally, by combining our earlier analysis with the analysis in this subsection,
we can readily see that having both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks makes it
necessary to expand the type space, but does not change the main result.
3 Conclusion
We considered the optimal dynamic income taxation problem faced by a slug-
gish government that cannot change its tax rule over time. Because of the govern-
ment’s sluggishness, we could reduce our problem to a static one and analytically
characterize the second-best tax rule. We argued that the zero top marginal tax
result is of little importance in practice because it would apply only when the top
earner in the initial period receives the largest value of shock in every period. This
is a probability zero event, so ex post we ensure a positive tax rate for the top type.22
Regarding the sluggishness of the government, we have made an extreme as-
sumption: the government cannot make its tax rule time-dependent and thus its
tax rates cannot be history-dependent at all. It might be more realistic to consider
the situation in which the government can make its tax rule time-dependent or
look at past histories at some cost. This should be a subject of future research.
Finally, although we characterized an optimal tax rule, we did not address its
existence. This can probably be proved using the results of Berliant and Page (2001)
for static optimal taxes.
21Note that if the government could look at history, it would suce to let agents report only in
the initial period. Indeed, as long as they report truthfully in the initial period, the government can
see through their misreports in the subsequent periods because it can observe the shock.
22In this paper, we consider a finite-horizon model. Technically speaking, we use optimal control
theory, so by replacing terminal conditions with transversality conditions, we would be able to
extend both Propositions 1 and 2 to an infinite-horizon model.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We show that due to the sluggishness of the government, our
problem can be reduced to a static problem and then invoke the results of Hellwig
(2007) who analyzes a static optimal taxation problem under the utilitarian welfare
function. As in Hellwig (2007), we consider a relaxed problem by replacing the IC
constraint with a weaker condition that is called the downward IC constraint:
8w 2 Wt; u (x(w);w)  u (x(w0);w) for all w0 2 fw˜ 2 Wt : w˜  wg : (IC0t)
for each t. Thus, the downward IC constraint takes care of only downward devia-
tions. By Lemma 6.2 of Hellwig (2007), x(  ) with nondecreasing c(  ) satisfies (IC0t) if
and only if du(x(w);w)dw  uw(x(w);w) for all w 2 Wt. Thus, when we solve the problem,
we impose the constraints that c(w) is nondecreasing and du(x(w);w)dw  uw(x(w);w) on
W =
ST
t=0Wt instead of the downward IC constraints.
Next, we rewrite the welfare function asZ
W0
V(x(  );w) fw(w)dw
=
Z
W0
2666664u(x(w);w) + TX
t=1
t
Z
ZT
u(x(wt);wt) fz(zT)dzT
3777775 fw(w)dw
=
Z
W0
u(x(w);w) fw(w)dw +
TX
t=1
t
Z
Wt
u(x(wt);wt) ft(wt)dwt
where ft(w) =
R
ZT
fz(zT) fw( 1t (w; z
T))d
 1
t (w;z
T)
dw dz
T. Let fw be an extension of fw to W
(i.e., fw(w) = fw(w) onW0 and fw(w) = 0 onW nW0). Similarly, let ft be an extension
of ft toW. Then, the above expression reduces toZ
W
u(x(w);w)g(w)dw (5)
where g(w)  fw(w) +PTt=1 t ft(w). Likewise, the resource constraint is reduced to
G 
Z
W
(w)g(w)dw: (6)
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Therefore, our relaxed problem is given by
max
x(  )
Z
W
u(x(w);w)g(w)dw
s.t. G 
Z
W
(w)g(w)dw;
c(w) is nondecreasing and du(x(w);w)dw  uw(x(w);w) on W:
(7)
On the other hand, Hellwig (2007) considers a standard static optimal taxation
problem. Specifically, under our notations, his problem is written as
max
x(  )
Z
W0
u(x(w);w) fw(w)dw
s.t. G 
Z
W0
(w) fw(w)dw;
c(w) is nondecreasing and du(x(w);w)dw  uw(x(w);w) on W0:
(8)
Hence, we can see that our problem can be viewed as a static problem in which the
total mass of agents is
PT
t=0 
t, the support of type distribution isW, and the welfare
weight for type w is g(w), and therefore, the arguments of Hellwig (2007) directly
apply. In particular, the property (i) follows from Theorem 6.1 and the property (ii)
from Theorems 4.1 and 6.1 of Hellwig (2007). 
References
Albanesi, S. and C. Sleet. (2006), ”Dynamic optimal taxation with private infor-
mation,” Review of Economic Studies, 73, 1-30.
Battaglini, M. and S. Coate. (2008), ”Pareto ecient income taxation with
stochastic abilities,” Journal of Public Economics, 92, 844-868.
Berliant, M. and J. Ledyard., ”Optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxes with no
commitment,” forthcoming, Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Berliant, M. and F. H. Page. (2001), ”Income taxes and the provision of public
goods: existence of an optimum,” Econometrica, 69, 771-784.
Brito, L. D., J. H. Hamilton, S. M. Slutsky, and J. E. Stiglitz. (1991), ”Dynamic
optimal income taxation with government commitment,” Journal of Public
Economics, 44, 15-35.
14
Diamond, P. and E. Saez. (2011), ”The case for a progressive tax: From basic
research to policy recommendation,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25, 165-
190.
Farhi, E. and I. Werning., ”Insurance and taxation over the life cycle,” forthcom-
ing, Review of Economic Studies.
Gaube, T. (2010), ”Taxation of annual income as a commitment device,” Unpub-
lished manuscript.
Hammond, P. (1979), ”Straightforward individual incentive compatibility in
large economies,” Review of Economic Studies, 46, 263-282.
Hellwig, M. F. (2007), ”A contribution to the theory of optimal utilitarian income
taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, 91, 1449-1477.
Judd, K. L. (1985), ”The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random
variables,” Journal of Economic Theory, 35, 19-25.
Kapicka, M. (2006), ”Optimal income taxationwith human capital accumulation
and limited record keeping,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 9, 612-639.
Kocherlakota, N. (2010), The New Dynamic Public Finance, Princeton University
Press.
Kocherlakota, N. (2005), ”Zero expected wealth taxes: A Mirrlees approach to
dynamic optimal taxation,” Econometrica, 73, 1587-1621.
Kocherlakota, N. (2004), ”Wedges and taxes,” American Economic Review, 94,
109-113.
Mirrlees, J. A. (1971), ”An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation,”
Review of Economic Studies, 38, 175-208.
Seade, J. K. (1982), ”On the sign of the optimum marginal income tax,” Review
of Economic Studies, 49, 637-643.
Sun, Y. (2006), ”The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and char-
acterization of insurable risks,” Journal of Economic Theory, 126, 31-69.
15
